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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(i)/ Utah Code Annotated 1953, in that the 
matter is one over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
Plaintiff L.P. Biorn, Inc. of Wyoming commenced this action 
against defendants seeking recovery of amounts owing it for 
rental equipment furnished Gallegos Construction Company and 
used by Gallegos to fulfill a gravel products subcontract with 
Kiewit Western, the prime contractor, for the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court err in ruling that Biorn was required 
to strictly comply with the provision calling for notice to the 
surety of Section 63-56-38(3)/ Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended 
in April/ 1985)/ in that Biorn had given notice within the ninety 
day period to Kiewit/ the prime contractor/ as required by the 
statute prior to April/ 1985. 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that Biorn failed 
to give notice to the surety within ninety days of the date 
the last labor and materials were provided on the job. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
1. Section 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended 
in 1983 and prior to repeal in 1987). 
See Appendix B. 
2. Section 63-56-38(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as 
amended in April, 1985). 
See Appendix C. 
36 Section 63-56-38(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953 ( as 
amended in April, 1987). 
See Appendix D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This action was brought by L. P. Biorn/ Inc. of Wyoming/ 
to recover amounts owing it for rental equipment furnished 
Gallegos Construction Company and used to produce gravel products 
for the prime contractor/ Kiewit Western Company/ on a State of 
Utah highway construction project. Defendant Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Company provided the payment bond on the project (R. 37-46). 
Judgment by default was entered against defendant Gallegos 
Construction on April 16, 1986 (R. 50, 52-53). 
A nonjury trial involving the remaining parties was 
scheduled for September 29, 1986 (R. 71-72). At a pretrial 
conference on September 22/ 1986/ the Court indentified four 
legal issues which were briefed by the parties and subsequently 
argued to the Court/ along with Kiewit and Aetna's motion for 
summary judgment/ on August 29, 1986 (R. 73-114). 
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on 
September 29, 1986, the Court held that rental equipment was 
part of the labor or materials covered by Section 63-56-38, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953; that a materialman is a subcontractor 
within the meaning of Section 63-56-38; that a ninety day notice 
requirement with regard to Aetna was subject to strict 
interpretation; and that Biorn was not entitled to recovery of 
attorney's fees against Aetna or Kiewit (R. 129-131). 
The Court held that the following issues would be tried/ 
namely the amount in controversy/ whether or not the Biorn claim 
was barred by inadequate notice to Aetna/ whether the rental 
equipment was used on other projects besides the Kiewit project/ 
and whether Biorn was entitled to recovery of penalty interest 
(R. 131-133). 
At the conclusion of Biorn's case in chief on September 30/ 
1986/ the attorney for Kiewit and Aetna moved the Court to 
dismiss the case on the basis that notice to Aetna was not given 
within the niney day period set forth in Section 63-56-38 
(R« 84-85). The Court granted the motion to dismiss and found 
that the last material and labor was provided by Biorn on May 13/ 
1985 and that notice received by Aetna on August 14, 1985 was 
inadequate (R. 135-137). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between approximately March 1, 1987 and May 13, 1987, 
plaintiff Biorn rented certain equipment and materials to 
defendant Gallegos Construction Company, including an 
International H-90 front end loader, a 175 Clark loader, a 
water truck, a service truck, an air compressor, a welder, and 
a fuel tank (Exhibit P-2; R. 40-42). 
The hours and amounts set forth in the invoices were 
reviewed and approved by Gallegos on May 13, 1985 (R. 193-196), 
but Gallegos failed to pay the invoices due and owing (R. 181) 
Some of the Biorn equipment was removed from the job site 
on May 13, 1985, some on May 14, and some on May 17 (R„ 171). 
The H-90 International, the water truck, and the service truck 
were removed on May 13 and 14, 1985 (R. 210-211). The air 
compressor and welder were picked up on May 17, 1985 (R. 212). 
The fuel tank provided by Biorn pursuant to a lease-purchase 
agreement was retained by Gallegos at the job site (R. 213-216, 
218). 
The 175 Clark loader referred to in the invoices was 
leased by Biorn from Foulger Equipment Company and was then 
subleased to Gallegos (R. 205-206). 
Upon failure of Gallegos to pay for the subject equipment 
rentals, Biorn gave written notice to Kiewit on or about May 21, 
1985 of Biorn's intent to sue on the payment bond on the project 
to recover $44,428.93 (Exhibit P-4). On August 13, 1985, Biorn 
gave written notice to defendant Aetna, which notice was 
received by Aetna on August 14, 1985 (Exhibit P-3). The present 
action was filed on or about September 13/ 1985 (R. 12-13) 
and an Amended Complaint/ pursuant to stipulation of the parties/ 
was filed on or about March 3, 1986 (R. 37-43, 51). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
During the course of Biorn's rental contract with 
Gallegos, an amendment by the Utah legislature to the controlling 
statute, Section 68-56-38(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, became 
effective. Biorn asserts that the statute in effect at the 
time the subject payment bond was issued controlled the rights 
and obligations of the parties with respect to the payment bond, 
including notice of intent to claim against the bond. 
In the event the court determines that Biorn was required 
to proceed under the amended statute, Biorn complied with the 
requirements by giving notice to the prime contractor within 
the ninety day period, as well as notice to the surety, even if 
the notice to the surety was beyond ninety days. 
The legislature^ subsequent amendment of Section 63-56-38(3) 
in April, 1987 deleting any notice provisions with respect to 
the surety demonstrates the legislature's intent that notice to 
the prime contractor was of paramount importance and notice to 
the surety was of secondary importance. Substantial compliance 
with the notice provision relating to the surety is adequate. 
POINT II 
Biorn provided a fuel storage tank used by Gallegos up 
to May 17, 1985 and thereafter. The tank was provided pursuant 
to a lease-purchase agreement with Gallegos which was not 
performed by Gallegos. The use of the tank by Gallegos extended 
the time in which Biorn could give notice of intent to proceed 
against the bond. 
Biorn also provided a welder and air compressor which 
were available for use by Gallegos until May 17/ 1987/ also 
extending the time period during which notice relating to the 
bond could be given. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. BIORN HAS COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS IN EFFECT WHEN THE 
WORK WAS COMMENCED. 
Plaintiff Biorn/ in attempting to recover amounts owed it 
by defendant Gallegos for rental equipment/ pursued its remedies 
under Utah's Public Bonding Statutes/ namely Section 14-1-14 and 
Section 63-56-38(3)/ Utah Code Annotated 1953. The payment bond 
under which Biorn proceeded (R. 13/ R. 43 and Appendix A) refers 
exclusively to Title 14/ Chapter 1/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ 
which at the time of the execution of the bond in January/ 1985 
comprised Sections 14-1-13 through 14-1-17. Pursuant to Section 
14-1-14(2): 
Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the 
contractor/ but no express or implied contract with the 
contractor furnishing the payment bond/ shall have a 
right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written 
notice to the contractor within 90 days from; the date 
on which the last of the labor was performed or materials 
supplied. 
It appears/ however/ that the controlling statute with 
regard to this State of Utah highway construction project was 
found in Utah's Procurement Code7 Section 63-56-36(3)/ which in 
January/ 1985 read as follows: 
Any person who has furnished labor or material to the 
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in 
the contract/ in respect of which a payment bond is 
furnished under this section/ who has not been paid 
in full within 90 days from the date on which the last 
of the labor was performed or material was supplied by 
the person for whom the claim is made/ shall have the 
right to sue on the payment bond for any amount unpaid 
at the time the suit is instituted and to prosecute 
the action for the amount due the person. However/ 
any person having a contract with a subcontractor of 
the contractor/ but no express or implied contract 
with the contractor furnishing the payment bond/ shall 
have a right of action upon the payment bond upon 
giving written notice to the contractor within 90 
days from the date on which the last of the labor 
was performed or material was supplied by the 
person for whom the claim is made. The person shall 
state in the notice the amount claimed and the name 
of the party for whom the labor was performed or to 
whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be 
served personally or by registered or certified mail/ 
postage prepaid/ in an envelope addressed to the 
contractor at any place the contractor maintains 
an office or conducts business. (See Appendix C) 
The purpose for notice to the prime contractor is well 
explained in case law interpreting the Federal equivalent to 
Utah's Public Bonding Statutes/ the Miller Act/ 40 U.S.C. Sections 
270a and 270b. For example/ in United States v. A & L Mechanical 
Contractors/ Inc./ 677 F.2d 383 (1983), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated as follows: 
The design of the [Miller Act] is to give contractors/ 
such as Honeywell, ninety days after completion of 
their work within which to assert a claim against the 
general contractor and its surety. If it does not do so 
within that period, the contractor may make final 
payment to the subcontractor with impunity. It would 
be quite unfair to the general contractor to expose it 
to stale claims of which it had no notice during the 
ninety day period. Ij3. at 386/ referring to Noland 
Company v. Allied Contractors/ Inc./ 273 F.2d 917, 
920-21 (4th Cir. 1955). 
Under the Miller Act, such notice to the general contractor 
and its surety is accomplished by giving written notice to the 
prime contractor. No specific notice requirement is included 
for the surety, apparently on the basis that the prime contractor 
will generally make any payments claimed under the bond and 
will be liable to the surety in the event the surety is required 
to make payments. Virtually all cases interpreting the purpose 
of the Miller Act refer to the prime contractor's ultimate 
liability for any claims against the bond* See, for example, 
United States v. A & L Mechanical Contractors, Inc., supra at 
386; Noland Company v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 273 F.2d 917, 
920-21 (4th Cir. 1959); Frank Briscoe Company v. United States, 
396 F.2d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1968); McWaters & Bartlett v. United 
States for Use and Benefit of Wilson, 272 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.) 
(1959). 
As stated by the District Court for the District of Idaho 
in United States ex rel and for Use and Benefit of Korosh v. Otis 
Will-iams & Co., 30 F. Supp 590 (1939), the ninety day notice 
applies to the contractor and not to the surety: 
The ninety day notice required to be given by 
the Statute applies to the contractor and not to the 
surety whose liability is co-extensive with the 
original contractor. It is for the purpose of advising 
the contractor of any advances created by his sub-contractor 
so that he might be protected on the final settlement . . . 
Id. at 593. 
In the present case, notice was given on or about May 21, 
1985, well within the ninety day period, to Kiewit, the prime 
contractor (R. 42-43; Exhibit P-4). Defendants contend, however, 
that Biorn was required to give notice within the ninety day 
period to Aetna, the surety (R. 80-81), as set forth in Section 
63-56-38(3) after its amendment on April 27, 1985. Biorn 
contends that its notice meets the requirements of the public 
bonding statutes applicable to its claim. 
BIORN IS COVERED BY THE PUBLIC BONDING STATUTE 
IN EFFECT WHEN "HE FIRST PROVIDED EQUIPMENT 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, Biorn first provided 
equipment to Gallegos on or about March 1, 1985 (R. 146). The 
version of Section 63-56-38(3) in effect at that time required 
only notice to the prime contractor within ninety days from the 
date the last labor or material was provided. The payment bond 
executed January 7, 1985 incorporated by reference the provisions 
of Section 14-1-13, et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953 as it 
existed at that time (and by extension Section 63-56-38) and 
provided that "all liabilities on this bond to all such claimants 
shall be determined in accordance with said provisions, to the 
same extent as if they were copied at length herein." (Appendix A) 
The Aetna payment bond thus fixed the rights and obligations 
of Kiewit and Aetna and the claimants on the bond and limited 
those rights and obligations to those provided in the bonding 
statute in effect on January 7, 1985. Pursuant to accepted 
principles of statutory construction, an amendment or repeal of 
the controlling statute after the rights and obligations of the 
parties are established does not destroy those rights or 
obligations. For example, the Model Uniform Statutory Construction 
Act provides as follows: 
The reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a 
statute does not, except as provided in Uniform 
Statutory Construction Act Section 25(b) [referring 
to reduced penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for 
any offense] (1) affect the prior operation of the 
statute or any prior action taken thereunder, 
(2) affect any validation, cure, right, privilege, 
obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, 
accorded, or incurred thereunder, (3) affect any 
violation thereof or penalty, forfeiture, or punishment 
incurred in respect thereto, prior to the amendment or 
repeal, or (4) affect any investigation, proceeding, 
or remedy in respect of any privilege, obligation, 
liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment; . . . 
73 Am.Jur.2d, Section 350, p 52, 1983 pocket part. 
Another element of general statutory construction is 
stated as follows: 
Statutes framed in general terms ordinarily apply 
to cases and subjects within their terms subsequently 
arising/ and unless plainly indicating the contrary/ 
are to be construed prospectively/ especially where 
substantive rights are involved. Accordingly/ it 
is a usual rule of statutory construction that 
legislative enactments in general and comprehensive 
terms/ prospective in operation/ apply alike to all 
persons/ subjects/ and business within their purview 
and scope coming into existence subsequent to their 
passage. 82 C.J.S. Section 319/ p 558* 
Utah law expressly provides that repeal of a statute does 
not affect an accrued right or proceeding then under way: 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute 
previously repealed/ or affect any right which has 
accrued/ any duty imposed/ any penalty incurred/ or 
any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue 
of the statute repealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court cited the foregoing statute in City Electric 
v. Industrial Indemnity Co./ 683 P.2d 1053/ 1054n.l (1984) in 
support of its conclusion that Section 14-1-5/ et seq./ although 
repealed prior to commencement of the action/ applied to the 
matter because the provisions were in effect when the rights and 
obligations giving rise to the action accrued. 
In an earlier decision by this Court/ Buttrey v. Guaranteed 
Securities Co./ 78 Utah 39/ 300 P. 1040 (1931), the court 
interpreted the same statute and held that vested rights created 
by the statute could not be destroyed by repeal of the statute 
which had created the rights. jCd. at 78 Utah 51. 
Applying the foregoing principles to the present fact 
situation, Biorn's rights and obligations under the payment bond 
were fixed at the time the payment bond was executed/ prior to 
his furnishing of rental equipment in March/ 1985. The notice 
given by Biorn fully conforms with the requirements of Section 
63-56-38 then in effect and by which all of the parties to the 
bond, including claimants, were governed. 
REPEAL OF THE PROVISION FOR NOTICE TO 
SURETY IN APRIL, 1987 DEMONSTRATES 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Even if this Court determined that Biorn should be governed 
by the provisions of Section 63-56-38 as they were set forth after 
the April 27, 1985 amendments, the subsequent actions of the Utah 
legislature demonstrate that the provision calling for notice 
to the surety should not be given the same weight as the provision 
requiring notice to the prime contractor. A comparison of 
Section 68-56-38(3) in its April, 1985 form with its April, 1987 
form shows that all provisions calling for notice to the surety 
which were added in 1985 were deleted in 1987. No similar 
provisions calling for notice to a surety were added to Section 
14-1-14 prior to its repeal in April, 1987 nor has any similar 
requirement been added to the private bonding statutes, 41-2-1, 
et seq. 
The similarities between the notice provisions of the Utah 
Bonding Statutes and the Miller Act, supra, demonstrate the Utah 
legislature's intent to pattern the state statute after the 
federal provision, which requires that ninety day notice be given 
to the prime contractor, but not the surety. The addition 
of a notice provision to the surety to Section 63-56-38(3) for 
a two year period, and its subsequent deletion indicate that the 
legislature considers and has considered notice to the prime 
contractor to be paramount. It is given that notice to the 
prime contractor under both Utah law and the Miller Act is a 
condition precedent to a successful claim against the contractor 
and surety. The provision added to Section 68-56-38(3) between 
April, 1985 and April, 1987 calling for notice to the surety 
does not rise to the same level of importance. Substantial 
compliance with that provision should be acceptable. 
Utah courts have applied the doctrine of substantial 
compliance to mechanic's lien cases. In Graff v. Boise Cascade 
Corporation, 660 P.2d 721, 722 (1983), the court reaffirmed 
that "the doctrine of substantial compliance has validity and 
it has application in an appropriate case." Biorn submits that 
the present case is an appropriate one for application of the 
doctrine with regard to notice to Aetna. The purpose for the 
notice requirement, namely notice to the prime contractor, was 
accomplished in this case. Notice to the surety should be 
considered a secondary requirement and Biorn submits that the 
notice to Aetna, even if determined to be beyond the ninety day 
time period, was substantially complied with. 
In support of Biornfs position with regard to interpretation 
of the hastily withdrawn provision concerning notice to the surety, 
a longstanding rule of statutory construction provides that 
subsequent amendments to a statute may be used by the court in 
construing the prior statute: 
The interpretation of a statute by the legislative 
department of the government may go far to remove 
doubt as to its meaning. This fact is recognized 
by the courts, which regard it as as proper to 
take into consideration, in determining the meaning 
of a statute, subsequent action of the legislature, 
or the interpretation which the legislature 
subsequently places upon the statute. It has been 
said that there are no prinicples of construction 
which prevent the utilization by the courts of 
subsequent enactments or amendments as an aid in 
arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute, 
and it is very common for a court, in construing 
a statute, to refer to subsequent legislation as 
impliedly confirming the view which the court has 
decided to adopt. Indeed, it has been held that 
if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute 
in pari materia what meaning the legislature 
attached to the words of a former statute, they will 
amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning 
and will govern the construction of the first statute. 
73 Am.Jur.2d, Section 178, p 380-381. 
Although dealing with interpretation of DUI ordinances 
and statutes, this Court in Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 
1318 (1983), cited with approval a similar principle of statutory 
construction relating to construction of two different statutes: 
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that 
whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has 
in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject 
matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of 
any express repeal or amendment therein, the new 
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative 
policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all 
should be construed together. Citing 2A C. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction Section 51.02, at 
290 (4th ed. 1973). 
A review of Utah Public Bonding Statutes, including Title 14, 
Chapter 1 in its versions prior to 1983, and prior to repeal in 
1987, and 63-56-38, both before and after the 1985 and 1987 
amendments, demonstrates clearly the significance placed by the 
legislature on notice to the prime contractor by materialmen 
or subcontractors claiming against payment bonds. Equally clear 
is the legislature's intent that notice to the surety is of 
secondary importance, even during the period such provision 
was included in the Section 68-56-38(3) period. The legislative 
history thus supports Biorn's position that the trial court 
committed error in holding that Biorn was required to comply 
strictly with the provisions of Section 63-56-38(3) as amended 
in April/ 1985 requiring notice to the surety, where notice to 
the prime contractor had been given in a timely manner. 
POINT II. NOTICE TO AETNA WAS GIVEN WITHIN 
NINETY DAYS OF THE DATE EQUIPMENT 
WAS LAST USED ON THE JOB. 
Even if the Court holds that Biorn was required to strictly 
comply with the statute as amended in April, 1987 and is required 
to strictly comply with the provision concerning nine day notice 
to the surety, the facts establish that Biorn complied with the 
provision. 
The evidence is undisputed that a large water tank supplied 
by Biorn to Gallegos remained on the job at least through August, 
1985 (R. 172-173). Biorn testified that the tank was furnished 
to Gallegos pursuant to a lease-purchase arrangement (R. 159-160), 
that the replacement cost of the tank was approximately $67,000.00, 
and that the reasonable monthly rental rate for such a tank was 
$400.00 to $500.00 a month (R. 197). The fuel tank was full of 
fuel on Monday, May 13 and was used to fuel the Gallegos 
equipment during that week and thereafter (R.213-214). The 
lease extended for the duration of the job, or approximately 
six months, at the rate of $1,500.00 (R. 215). 
The courts interpreting the Miller Act, supra, have 
frequently dealt with the issue of when the ninety day notice 
period begins to run with regard to rental equipment. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Carter-
Schneider-Nelson, Inc. v. Campbell, 293 F.2d 816 (1961), held 
that: "The notice period runs from the time the equipment was 
last available for use on the project." Ld. at 820. The court 
in Campbell held that ninety day notice to the prime contractor 
had not been given where no leased equipment was present on the 
job site after December 5, 1956 and the notice to the prime 
contractor was dated March 8, 1957 and mailed on March 12/ 1957. 
In the present situation, the fuel tank was clearly 
available for use on the project after Biorn removed the last 
of his equipment on May 17/ 1987* And although title to the 
tank would have passed to Gallegos had he made a total of 
$1,500.00 in payments/ the tank clearly had not been sold to 
Gallegos but was leased to him until such time as he performed 
the conditions precedent to sale. 
Another case interpreting the date of commencement of the 
ninety day notice period is United States v. F.D. Rich Company/ 
190 F.Supp. 939 (D.Ct. 4n. D. Fla. 1961), in which the court 
held that the last day equipment was furnished under a rental 
contract was the last day of the rental term. Id. at 940-941. 
In the Rich case, the subcontractor rented a crane from August 30, 
1960 to September 30, 1960, after which the crane lay idle at 
the construction site. The court held that notice to the prime 
contractor given after April 20, 1961, when the equipment was 
removed from the construction site, was inadequate, since the 
notice was more than ninety days beyond the end of the rental 
term. In this case, it is significant that the rental term 
extended through August, 1985 and that the fuel tank was used 
by Gallegos for the duration of the job. Biorn testified that 
he attempted to remove the tank several times after May 17, 1987, 
but was unable to do so because it contained fuel. 
The court ruled that the fuel tank would not be considered 
an item of rental equipment because it was part of the lease-
sale agreement: 
So I guess the question arises when was the last day 
that the labor was performed or the materials supplied? 
I would hold as a matter of fact that the water (sic) 
tank is not part of the material which comes under 
this contract since it was the one item that was not 
leased or rented, but was under a lease-sale agreement. 
(R. 135-136) 
Having found that the fuel tank was part of a lease-sale 
agreement, the issue arises as to whether the supplying of 
equipment on a project under a lease-sale arrangement precludes 
its inclusion as an item of rental equipment. It is undisputed 
that, with the exception of certain payments made to Foulger 
Equipment Company by Gallegos, no payments were made to Biorn 
for the items of equipment furnished Gallegos. Thus no payments 
were applied to purchase of the tank. As indicated by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States for Use and 
Benefit of Eddies Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Federal Insurance 
Company, 634 F.2d 1050 (1980), fair rental charge for use of 
equipment is within the scope of the Miller Act, but purchase 
of the equipment is not covered. Biorn would submit that the 
lease-purchase agreement became, in fact, a lease when Gallegos 
failed to make any payments under the agrement and retained 
the tank for use during the course of the project. 
In addition to the fuel tank, a welder and air compressor 
remained at Gallegosfs shop until May 17, 1985, when they were 
removed by Biorn. Biorn testified that the compressor and 
welder had been used at the job site on an as needed basis 
through May 11, 1985 (R. 171), and that they would have been 
used by Gallegos during the week of May 13 through 17 if they 
were needed, although use of the equipment was not physically 
observed (R. 212-213). Biorn submits that the equipment was 
available for use during this period and, pursuant to the 
provisions of United States ex rel. Carter-Schneider-Nelson, 
Inc. v. Campbell, supra, the ninety day notice period should 
be construed to commence on May 17, 1985 when that equipment was 
removed. 
CONCLUSION 
Biorn submits that the rights and obligations of the 
parties to this action with regard to the public bonding 
requirements of Title 14, Chapter 1 and Section 63-56-38 were 
fixed at the time the bond was executed on or about January 7, 
1985. The parties had the right to rely on the statutory 
provision then in effect. The trial court in this matter 
improperly applied the requirements of Section 63-56-38(3) as 
amended on April 27, 1985. The court!s holding that Biorn did 
not comply with the requirements of the amended statute should 
be reversed. 
In the event the notice provisions in the 1985 amendment 
of Section 63-56-38(3) are found to apply in this action, the 
trial court erred in finding that Biorn was required to comply 
strictly with the provision calling for notice within ninety 
days to the surety. Biorn requests the court to reverse the 
court's holding. 
With regard to the timeliness of Biornfs notice to the 
surety/ Biorn requests the court to reverse the trial court's 
holding that the fuel tank could not be considered as part of 
the rental equipment supplied to Gallegos because the tank was 
part of the lease-purchase arrangement. Biorn submits that/ 
under the facts of the case/ the tank should be considered part 
of the equipment rented by Gallegos. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9*1 day of August, 1987. 
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
THOMAS R./KING \ 
Attorney ,fpr Plaintiff-Appellant 
L.P. Biorn/ Inc. of Wyoming 
ADDENDUM 
TlUt 24. CfcapUr I. **c. I, U.C.A.. It55* a* AM&dsd 
KNOW ALL ICEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
T K . K i e v i t W e s t e r n Co , . , . # 
That _ ^ larvioafler rtferrwd lo aa the 
••Prisclpa!/* suad ._ . I t l? . . £ . ? £ £ £ . . £ $ £ ^ 
« ©orporaLJoc erg*^*** aa5 tJdaUng « 5 e r the U * i of the Suae of £ ? . ™ . l " i i : I i £ 
_«.w .. - , . , - * * • .w <->«*- ~* H a r t f o r d C o n n e c t i c u t . , . 
with l u principal office to the City of . ^ . . . . . . . fceralaafler rmferrwd to aj the 
••Surety," axe bald and firmly bosjood unto the Stale of Utah by and through the Utah Departs eat of Traasportasnn. 
fcarali^Ur referred to « the •«Ohligwe0" 1* the amount of J i f J l L J l f . ^ 
•j>ne T h o u s a n d One H u n d r e d F o r t y - o n e a n d 4 0 / 1 0 0 - — - - - - - - - — " D o u ^ , r% 1 1 , 4 9 1 1 4 1 . 4 0 
tor the pajmeat whereof, the said Principal and Surety bind themselves, thslr heJra» administrators. •JLecutor*. 
a n c e s t o r s and assigns. Jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
WHEREAS, the Principal has altered Into a certain written coctract with the Obligee, daiad the 
d«y of -.'. 19 to oocttruct ..f?F.?Jlfj?.?.^ 
!}.&}?}&
 m _ u 
In the County of . .? .? .*L*£hi? ~ „.Sute of Utah. Project Ko L~JL\?X?AL_ 
tor the approximate sum of ..?.*5Y.f * . . * ^ 
J . 2 F . t t : ° ^ ^ ^ ^ ( f - l i i . * ? ^ ! " / . ^ . . . . , . which contract 1. hereby r e f e r s 
to and made a pari hereof as fully and to the same exleot as If copied at lasgth herein. 
NOW, THERE FORE, the condition of this obllgitJoo U »ucb. that If the said Principal ahull piy all claimants 
supplying labor or materials to h i e or his subcootractors in the prosecution of the wort provided for lr said 
contract, then, this ocllgatiqc ahall be void, otherwise to remain In full force and effect. 
PROVIDED. HOWEVER, that this bond ia axacuted pursuant to the pnrrtaiona of Title 14. Chapter 1. Utal 
Code Annotated, 19S3, a* amended, and all liabilities, on this bond to all sucb claimants ahall be determined In 
accordance with said provisions, to the ta^e extent aa if it were copied «1 lesgtb herein. 
IN W1TKESS WHEREOF, the said Principal aad Surety have signed and sealed this Instruaest this 7.P.U... 
19 . . . 8 5 . . day of J a j l ^ v 
Veronica Maldonado 
WITNESS 
r 
•a . 
...Ki.e>:Lt...V.?.5.t.§.n}...Qfi... (Seal) 
Principal 
The A e t n a C a s u a l t v and S u r e t v Cor.oanv 
' £^F? " ; 
Attorney-in-Fact 
J a c k i R. J o h n s t o n 
^^SrC^ 
G e r r i l y n n \ . Kremer 
STATE OF ]KC«? NEBRASKA 
COUNTY O F / J ^ y r i A K S DOUGLAS 
J ^ # k i . . ? . i . JfihP.?.P.9J?. ~ . .~ betn^ first duly rworo oo oath disposes and «eya. lhai*he Is the 
Attorney-in-Fact of*fct< I h e . . A £ . t J i a . X a S U & U x . . 3 B / L ^ — 
And thai she !• duly authorised to execute and deliver the foregoing obligition, that said Company Is authoritsd 
to*e&ecute the same, and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah In reference to beoomIngjtoIt surety 
•poo bonds, undertakings, and obligations. 
- , ^ ^ J i c k i R. J o h n s t - ^ ^ 
Sub#crilicd *ri swore U> before me this /.P.CU. day of . . ™ ^ . ^ . - S j t o t t S X y . . . " . " ^ L 
Nctary Publ ic- P a m e l a S . P r u i t t 
n/.u/.a?. 
AITIUIVKU PAMEU S PRUIH 
^ Owm EX;L Msv. 1< 1SS7 
m\*i*nl Alt tin*-y O v r a l Appendix -A 
TITLE 14 
CONTRACTORS' BONDS 
Chapter 
L Public Contracts. 
2. Private Contracts. 
CHAPTER 1 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Section 
14-1-1. Repealed. 
14-1-1.1. Repealed. 
14-1-2 to 14-1-4. Repealed. 
14-1-5 to 14-M2. Repealed. 
14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on 
public projects — Conditions 
and terms. 
Section 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivi-
sion failing to obtain bond. 
14-1-16. Attorney's fees. 
14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Pro-
curement Code. 
14-1-1. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 14-1-1 (L. 1909, ch. 68, 
§ 1; 1917, ch. 36, § 2; C.L. 1917, § 3753; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, § 17-1-1), providing for bond 
to protect mechanics and materialmen, was re-
pealed by Laws 1963, ch. 15, § 6. 
14-1-1.1. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 14-M.l (L. 1953, ch. 23, 
§ 1), relating to security in connection with 
bids, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5. 
For present comparable 
§ 63-56-1 et seq. 
provisions, see 
14-1-2 to 14-1-4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 14-1-2 to 14-1-4 (L. 
1909, ch. 68, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 36, § 2; C.L. 
1917, §§ 3753 to 3755; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-1-2 to 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, § 1), relating 
to recovery on bonds to protect mechanics and 
materialmen, were repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 
15, § 6. 
14-1-5 to 14-1-12. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 14-1-5 to 14-1-12 (L. 
1963, ch. 15, §§ 1 to 5; 1969, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 3), 
relating to bonding of contractors for public 
buildings and public works, were repealed by 
Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5. For present comparable 
provisions, see § 63-56-1 et seq. 
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14-1-13* Performance and payment bonds on public 
projects — Conditions and terms. 
(1) Before any contract for the construction, alteration or repair of any 
public building, public work or public improvement of the state or its political 
subdivisions is awarded to any person, that person shall furnish to the appro-
priate political entity the following bonds: 
(a) a performance bond in and amount equal to 100% of the price speci-
fied in the contract upon the faithful performance of the contract, solely 
for the protection of the political entity awarding the contract; and 
(b) a payment bond in an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in 
the contract, solely for the protection of persons supplying labor or mate-
rials to the contractor or his subcontractors for the performance of work 
provided for in the contract. 
(2) Each bond shall be: 
(a) binding upon the award of the contract to the person; 
(b) executed by a surety company or companies duly authorized to do 
business in this state; 
(c) payable to the appropriate political entity; and 
(d) filed in the office of the political entity awarding the contract. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the 
state or its political subdivisions to require additional performance bonds or 
other security. 
History: L» 1983, ch. 61, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Liability for failure to exact bond. 
Necessity for furnishing bond. 
Purpose and construction. 
Liability for failure to exact bond. 
Failure of a school district to require bond 
from contractor did not render it liable to con-
tractor's assignee whose right to money was 
subordinate to claims for labor and materials. 
South High School Dist. v. McMillan Paper & 
Supply Co., 49 Utah 477, 164 P. 1041 (1917); 
Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 Utah 
493, 164 P. 1047 (1917), applving Laws 1909, 
ch. 68. 
This section merely required contractor to 
execute the bond mentioned therein, but did 
not impose the duty upon any particular per-
son to exact such a bond. New York Blower Co. 
v. Carbon County High School. 50 Utah 342, 
167 P. 670 (1917). 
School district was not liable to parties sup-
plying labor and material to construct high 
school building for failure to require the bond 
mentioned herein. New York Blower Co. v. 
Carbon County High School, 50 Utah 342, 167 
P. 670 (1917). 
School trustees were not personally liable for 
failure to require the bond mentioned herein. 
New York Blower Co. v. Carbon County High 
School, 50 Utah 342, 167 P. 670 (1917). 
Necessity for furnishing bond. 
Under statute anyone interested could de-
mand that a bond be executed or required, and 
thereafter a refusal to do so would be willful. 
Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 Utah 
493, 164 P. 1047 (1917). 
Purpose and construction. 
Statute was highly remedial for the benefit 
of and to provide security for all persons fur-
nishing labor and materials on public work. 
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. District Court of Millard 
County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P.2d 255 (1936). 
Statute was not for the benefit of the con-
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tractor but for the benefit of the state, the cred- Campbell Bidg. Co.. 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 
itors and the surety. State ex rel. McBride v. (1938). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative A.L.R. — Duty of public authority to dis-
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L Rev. 115, 127. close to contractor information, allegedly in its 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' possession, affecting cost or feasibility of 
Bonds § 43 et seq.; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182. 
Works and Contracts § 99. Key Numbers. — States «=> 101. 
C.J.S. — 81A CJ.S. States § 119. 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract for which a payment bond 
is furnished under this chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days 
from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was 
supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for any amount 
unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the amount 
due. 
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but 
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment 
bond, shall have a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written 
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person shall state in the 
notice the amount claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was 
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be served 
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(3) Any person may obtain from the appropriate political entity a certified 
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and 
postage. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the con-
tents, execution, and delivery of the original. 
(4) Any action instituted on the payment bond shall be brought in the 
appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to be 
performed. The action shall be commenced within one one year after the 
furnishing of materials or labor, except if the claimant is a subcontractor of 
the contractor, the action shall be commenced within one year from the date 
on which final payment under the subcontract became due. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of contract. 
Claims of creditors against contractor. 
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Last day material furnished. 
Lien of laborers or materialmen. 
Purpose and construction of act. 
Timeliness of notice. 
Abandonment of contract 
A contract could not be regarded as aban-
doned if its terms and conditions were per-
formed by surety company instead of by the 
contractor. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914). 
Claims of creditors against contractor. 
The statute dealt only with actions against 
the surety; claims of creditors against the con-
tractor were not affected thereby and could be 
asserted at any time within the general statute 
of limitations. State ex rel McBride v. Camp-
bell Bldg Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 PJ2d 341 U938>. 
Last day materia] furnished. 
Date on which the last of material was fur-
nished was the delivery date for purposes of 
this section and it was not extended by subse-
quent substitution of new and different con-
trols to correct the supplier^ error. A.A. 
Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 24 
Utah 2d 369, 472 P.2d 424 (1970). 
Liens of laborers or materialmen. 
Although a workman or materialman could 
not acquire a lien on a public building for labor 
or material furnished in the construction of 
such building in view of § 38-1-1, he might 
have a preferential right to money in the 
hands of the public corporation to be used in 
the construction of the building under this sec-
tion. Mountain States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-
Allen Co., 63 Utah 384, 225 P. 811 (1924). 
Purpose and construction of act. 
Former law, insofar as it allowed "any per-
son" supplying labor or materials to sue, was 
highly remedial, and was, in furtherance of 
justice, to receive a liberal construction and ap-
plication so as to accomplish its real object and 
purpose. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914), applying Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed. 
The purpose of the former statute was to en-
able creditors of or claimants against contrac-
tor on public buildings to collect for work and 
materials furnished by them ratably and equi-
tably from contractor and his bondsmen in all 
cases to the full amount and extent of the 
surety bond. Board of Educ. v. West, 55 Utah 
357, 186 P. 114 (1919). 
Timeliness of notice. 
Materialman having delivered goods to sub-
contractor of state-owned bridge project could 
not hold the prime contractor or surety liable 
for payment where he had no contractual rela-
tionship with the prime contractor and did not 
give ninety-day notice to the contractor; under 
the prior law, plaintiff had no action against 
the prime contractor or surety because the ac-
tion was not commenced within one year of the 
date of final settlement of the bridge contract 
by the state. American Oil Co. v. General Con-
tracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486 
(1966). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 114 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States § 125. 
Key Numbers. — States *=> 101. 
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivision failing to 
obtain bond. 
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails to obtain a payment bond, 
it shall, upon demand by a person who has supplied materials or performed 
labor under the applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person, 
and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his account against the 
appropriate political entity in any court having jurisdiction in the county in 
which the contract was to be performed. The action shall be commenced 
within one year after the furnishing of materials or labor. 
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History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 3. 
14-1-16. Attorney's fees. 
The prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L 1983, ch. 61, § 4. 
14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Procurement 
Code. 
This chapter shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63/ 
History: L. 1983, ch, 61, § 5. 
CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
Section 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics 
and materialmen — Attorney's 
fee. 
14-2-4. Exceptions — Mortgagees, beneficiar-
ies, trustees. 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract 
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful perfor-
mance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment 
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person 
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment 
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such 
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished, 
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not 
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1 to 3; C.L. ment inserted "equipment and materials 
1917, §§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, rented," after "material furnished" near the 
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1. end of the first sentence of the first paragraph 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- of the section; divided the second sentence into 
Section 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and mate-
rialmen. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond — Direct lia-
bility — Limitation of actions. 
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catalog of goods and services provided by the Correctional Industries Division. The 
catalog shall include a description and price of each item offered for sale. The cata-
log shall be updated and revised during the year as the director deems necessary. 
(3) State departments, agencies, and institutions may not purchase any goods 
or services provided by the Correctional Industries Division from any other source 
unless it has been determined in writing by the director of Correctional Industries 
and the state procurement officer or in the case of institutions of higher education, 
the institutional procurement officer, that purchase from the Correctional Indus-
tries Division is not feasible due to one of the following circumstances: 
(a) the good or service offered by the division does not meet the reasonable 
requirements of the purchasing agency; 
(b) the good or service cannot be supplied within a reasonable time by the divi-
sion; or 
(c) the cost of the good or service, including basic price, transportation costs, 
and other expenses of acquisition, is not competitive with the cost of procuring 
the item from another source. In cases of disagreement, the decision may be 
appealed to a board consisting of the director of the Department of Corrections, 
the director of Administrative Services, and a neutral third party agreed upon by 
the other two members or, in the case of institutions of higher education, the presi-
dent of the involved institution shall make the final decision. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-35.6, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 201, §2. 
63-56-35.7. Counties and municipalities eligible to participate in state 
agreements, contracts and surplus property program. Counties and municipali-
ties of this state are eligible to purchase from or otherwise participate in state 
public procurement unit agreements and contracts and may participate in the state 
surplus property program administered by the Division of Surplus Property. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-35.7, enacted by L. Title of Act. 
1983, ch. 296, § 1; L, 1984, ch. 65, § 12. An act relating to the Procurement Code; 
Comoiler's Notes providing that certain political subdivisions 
^
 A
 ' , , , . may participate in state procurement agree-
The 1984 amendment added "and may par-
 ments and contracts 
ticipate in the state surplus property pro-
 T h i s a c t e n a c t s g ^ ^ 63.56-35.?, Utah 
gram administered by the Division of Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1983, ch. 296. 
Surplus Property." 
Cross- References. 
Division of Surplus Property, 63-17-1 et 
seq. 
PARTE 
PROCUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTION 
Section 
63-56-36. Alternative methods of construction contracting management. 
63-56-37. Bid security requirements. 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. 
63-56-39 Form of bonds — Effect of certified cop\. 
63-56-36. Alternative methods of construction contracting management. 
Rules and regulations shall provide for as man\ alternative methods of contrac-
tion contracting management as determined to be feasible. These rules and regula-
tions shali: 
(1) Set forth criteria to be used in determining which method of construction 
contracting management is to be used for a particular project; 
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(2) Grant to the chief procurement officer or the head of the purchasing agency 
responsible for carrying out the construction project the discretion to select the 
appropriate method of construction contracting management for a particular 
project; and 
(3) Require the procurement officer to execute and include in the contract file 
a written statement setting forth the facts which led to the selection of a particular 
method of construction contracting management for each project. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-36, enacted by L 
1980, ch. 75, § 1. 
63-56-37. Bid security requirement*. (1) Bid security in amount equal to at 
least 5% of the amount of the bid shall be required for all competitive sealed bid-
ding for construction contracts. Bid security shall be a bond provided by a surety 
company authorized to do business in this state, the equivalent in cash, or any 
other form satisfactory to the state. 
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set 
forth in the invitation for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to rules 
and regulations, it is determined that the failure to comply with the security 
requirements is nonsubstantial. 
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period specified 
in the invitation for bids, except as provided in section 63-56-20(6). If a bidder is 
permitted to withdraw a bid before award, no action shall be taken against the 
bidder or the bid security. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-37, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 75, § 1. 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. (1) When a construc-
tion contract is awarded, the following bonds or security shall be delivered to the 
state and shall become binding on the parties upon the execution of the contract: 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 100% 
of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company authorized to 
do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 100% of 
the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company authorized to do 
business in this state or any other form satisfactory to the state, for the protection 
of all persons supplying labor and material to the contractor or its subcontractors 
for the performance of the work provided for in the contract. 
(2) Rules [ftftd regulations] may provide for waiver of the requirement of a per-
formance or payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection 
of the state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or subcon-
tractor for the work provided in the contract, in respect of which a payment bond 
is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full within 90 days from 
the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied 
by the person for whom the claim is made, [shaH have the rtfk* te] may sue on 
the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and 
M m a v prosecute the action for the amount due the person. [However,] Any person 
having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or implied 
contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, [shall have] has a right 
of action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor and 
surety company within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was 
performed or material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made. 
The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and the name of the party 
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for whom the labor was performed or to whom the material was supplied. The 
notice shall be served [personally or] by registered or certified mail, postage pre-
paid, [HI a« envelope addrcoocd to] on the contractor and surety company at am 
place the contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the district 
court of the county in which the construction contract was to be performed^ few 
«o 9«tt shall be commenced later tfwm one year *^ rwi« *ne flate wi" wnien tne last 
o* the labor ^^ tw performed or material wtts supplied by fclie person- bringing the 
oak?] No suit may be commenced t>£ a claimant under this section more than 180 
days after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim. The obligee named in the 
bond need not be joined as a party in the suit. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-38, enacted bv L. 
1980, ch. 75, § 1, L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Burden of proof. question was supplied as a part of the orig-
in action by materialman on payment n a l contract or for the purpose of correcting 
bond, materialman did not have the burden defects or making repairs following inspec-
to prove that the materials furnished were tion of the project. City Electric \ Industrie 
actually delivered to the job site or that they Indemnity Co. (1984) 683 P 2d 1053. 
were actually incorporated into the structure,
 W o r k performed without contract 
but only that the materials were furnished in „,, , , 
connection with the particular project City . * h « r * constructs company proceeded to 
Electric v Industrial Indemnity Co. (1984) ? e m ? ^ r*c* tracck *nd m s t* n a sc*ce//*ld 
683 P 2d 1053 Golden Spikers and state? of I tan 
without an executed agreement and without 
Timeliness of action. compliance with §64-1-4, there was no con-
The appropriate test for determining tract with the state of Utah by which it wa? 
whether an action on a payment bond was obliged to require the Golden Spikers to fur-
brought within the required statutory time nish performance and payment bond-
period was not the "substantial completion"' Breitling Bros. Construction, Inc v Utah 
date; it was rather whether the material in Golden Spikers, Inc. (1979} 597 P 2d 869 
63-56-39. Form of bonds — Effect of certified copy. The form of the bond? 
required by this part shall be established by rules and regulations. Any person ma} 
obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of repro-
duction of the bond and postage, if any. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima 
facie evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-39, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 75, § 1. 
PARTF 
CONTRACT CLAUSES 
Section 
63-56-40. Required contract clauses — Computation of price adjustments — Use of rules an: 
regulations. 
63-56-41. Certification of change order. 
63-56-40. Required contract clauses — Computation of price adjustment* 
— Use of rules and regulations. (1) Rules and regulations shall require fnr -• 
construction contracts and ma\ permit or require for state contracts f >T -
and services the inclusion of clauses providing for adju-tnifnt- in p-..c-
performance, or other appropriate contract provisions, and co\enng the : 
subjects: 
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ment July 1, 1987" and in chapter 33 omitted 1987 to July 1, 1997 and added a termination 
the reference to "Governor's Advisory Council date for the Division of Marketing and Promo-
on Community Affairs July 1,1985"; in Sub- tion of July 1,1992; in Subsection (20) changed 
section (16)(b) changed the termination date of the termination date of Division of Parks and 
Division of Construction and Division of Pre- Recreation from July 1,1987 to July 1,1997; in 
construction both from July 1,1987 to July 1, Subsection (21) changed the termination dates 
1997; in Subsection (18) changed the termina- of the Division of Alcoholism and Drugs and 
tion date from July 1, 1987 to July 1,1997; in the Division of Mental Health both from July 
Subsection (19) changed the termination date 1, 1987 to July 1, 1997; and made some minor 
of Animal Identification and Agricultural De- changes in phraseology and punctuation 
velopment and Conservation both from July 1, throughout the section. 
CHAPTER 56 
UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE 
Part E Section 
Procurement of Construction 63-56-60. Effect of prior determination by 
m . agents of state. 
Section 
63-56-37. Bid security requirements. p ^ j 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is 
awarded. Intergovernmental Relations 
Part H 63-56-69. Chief procurement officer to collect 
Legal and Contractual Remedies information as to supplies, etc. 
63-56-46. Effect of timely protest. 
63-56-5. Definitions-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What constitutes "public work" 
within statute relating to contractor's bond, 48 
AX.R.4th 1170. 
PART E 
PROCUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTION 
63-56-37. Bid security requirements. 
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least 5% of the amount of the bid 
shall be required for all competitive sealed bidding for construction contracts. 
Bid security shall be a bond provided by a surety company authorized to do 
business in this state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form satisfactory to 
the state. 
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set 
forth in the invitation for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to 
rules, it is determined that the failure to comply with the security require-
ments is nonsubstantial. 
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period speci-
fied in the invitation for bids, except as provided in Subsection 63-56-20(6). If 
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• a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before award, no action shall be taken 
against the bidder or the bid security. 
* History: C. 1953, 63-56-37, enacted by L. ment deleted "and regulations" following 
1980, cho 75, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, ft 125. "rules" in Subsection (2) and corrected a statu-
t Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tory reference in Subsection (3). 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. 
< (1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following bonds or secu-
rity shall be delivered to the state and shall become binding on the parties 
upon the execution of the contract: 
u (a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to 
'• the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to 
the state, for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material to 
the contractor or its subcontractors for the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a performance or 
payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of the 
state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided for in the contract, in respect of which a 
payment bond is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full 
therefor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was 
performed by him or material was supplied by him for which the claim is 
made, may sue on the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the 
suit is instituted and may prosecute the action for the amount due him. Any 
person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no ex-
press or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, 
has a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the 
contractor within 90 days from the date on which such person performed the 
last of the labor or supplied the last of the material for which the claim is 
made The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and the name 
of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the material was 
supplied. The notice shall be served by registered or certified mail, postage 
prepaid, on the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the district 
court of any county in which the construction contract was to be performed. 
No suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the day on 
which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the 
person bringing the suit. The obligee named in the bond need not be joined as 
a party in the suit. 
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History: C. 1953, 63-56-38, enacted by L. days after a surety finally denies the claim-
1980, ch. 75, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1; 1987, ants claim"; and made various stylistic and 
ch. 218, § 10. phraseology changes throughout the section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Applicability. - Laws 1987, ck 218, § 12 
ment, in Subsection (3) ikletedand surety ^ ^
 C h 2 1 g H e g ^ 
company following contractor^ in the second f . _ , r «* » •« «„ ,1«« 
slnten J and twicf in the fourth sentence; in **** «****? ™ °J ***T A P n l 2 7 ' 198J> ** 
Subsection (4), substituted the present second to I*"** « » bonds m connection with such 
sentence for "No suit may be commenced by contracts, 
claimant under this section more than 180 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Materialman. materialman who has not been paid in full 
Inasmuch as a materialman is precluded un- within the time period required by this section 
der § 38-1-1 from placing a lien on public prop- may proceed directly against the bonding com-
erty, the defense which may be asserted under pany without encountering such a defense 
§ 58A-la-12 does not apply to a claim of a ma- against its claim. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H 
terialman furnishing materials or labor to a j , ^ Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). 
bonded public construction project. Thus, the 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What constitutes public work" 
within statute relating to contractor's bond, 48 
A.L.R.4th 1170. 
PART H 
LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
63-56-46. Effect of timely protest 
In the event of a timely protest under Subsection 63-56-45(1), 63-56-54(1), 
or 63-56-59(1), the state shall not proceed further with the solicitation or with 
the award of the contract until all administrative and judicial remedies have 
been exhausted or until the chief procurement officer, after consultation with 
the head of the using agency or the head of a purchasing agency, makes a 
written determination that the award of the contract without delay is neces-
sary to protect substantial interests of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-46, enacted by L. ment corrected the statutory reference at the 
1980, ch. 75, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 126. - beginning of the section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
63-56-60- Effect of prior determination by agents of state-
In any judicial action under § 63-56-59, determinations by employees, 
agents, or other persons appointed by the state shall be final and conclusive 
only as provided in §§ 63-56-32 and 63-56-50, and Subsection 63-56-57(2). 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-60, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
1980, ch. 75, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 127. ment corrected the statutory references. 
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